BOOK II. of the passions.

PART I. of pride and humility

SECTION X. Of property and riches

The relation of property is that considered the closest to pride and that which produces it most commonly. But justice must be treated first. A definition of property is given: "such a relation betwixt a person and an object as permits him, but forbids any other, the free use and possession of it, without violating the laws of justice and moral equity." If justice is a virtue having a natural and original influence on the human mind, property can be seen as a species of causation. Or if it is an artificial virtue. "For then honour, and custom, and civil laws supply the place of natural conscience, and produce, in some degree, the same effects." In any case, the ideas of property and property owner carry the mind to each other. If Hume’s explanation of these passions is correct, "A relation of ideas, join’d to that of impressions, always produces a transition of affections; and therefore, whenever any pleasure or pain arises from an object, connected with us by property, we may be certain, that either pride or humility must arise from this conjunction of relations." If not, it can be seen to be true by what follows.

A vain man must have the best property of all sorts: wine, cookery, horses, art. "All objects, in a word, that are useful, beautiful or surprizing, or are related to such, may, by means of property, give rise to this passion [pride].
These agree in giving pleasure, and agree in nothing else. This alone is common to them; and therefore must be the quality that produces the passion, which is their common effect." Every new instance is an argument, and the instances are without number, so "I may venture to affirm, that scarce any system was ever so fully prov’d by experience, as that which I have here advanc’d."

The power of acquiring property has the same effect. Riches are what give this power, and only in this respect does it have any influences on the passions. The paper or metal of which they are made are of use only in acquiring possession. Now we are able to get "one of the strongest arguments I have yet employ’d to prove the influence of the double relations on pride and humility."

Although in the philosophy of the understanding, there is no difference between power and its exercise, in the philosophy of the passions, it is seen that the idea and supposition of power operate independently of their exercise. "We are pleas’d when we acquire an ability of procuring pleasure, and are displeas’d when another acquires the power of giving pain." This is clear from experience, but an explanation will be given.

The error of distinguishing power from its exercise is not entirely to "the scholastic doctrine of free-will," but from a vulgar doctrine. If a person has motives that lie between his power and its exercise, a man is said to have no power. Thus an enemy with a sword has no power over me when he sees it as in his interest not to run afoul of the law, but does have it when he can punish me without fear of consequences.

According to the philosophy of the understanding, the only distinction between the two cases is in past experience.
And on that basis, we attribute power to a person when there is a probable or possible exercise of it.

On this basis, I should feel uneasy when someone lacks a motive not to harm me, so that it is uncertain whether he will. The fact that, philosophically, the person did not have the power because he did not exercise it, "this prevents not my uneasiness from the preceding uncertainty." This also holds for the agreeable passions.

When a good approaches which is in one’s own power, the satisfaction felt increases, and the same joy is conveyed by the imagination as if the person were persuaded of the real existence of the thing.

But the satisfaction felt my the miser from the power of his money exists though he has enjoyed his wealth for forty years without ever having used it. So, the real existence of the pleasure, he must conclude, is no nearer to him than if he were a pauper. But, he imagines the nearer approach of the pleasure when all external obstacles are removed along with the opposing motives of interest and danger, which are more powerful still. Another argument depends on the false sensation of liberty we have. We imagine that the will moves more easily in every way, casting a shadow on the side to which it did not settle.

To bring the argument to a point: the essence of riches is the power to procure pleasure, and the essence of the power is in the probability of its exercise and the anticipation of the real existence of the pleasure. The anticipation is itself a pleasure, and the cause is a possession which we have. Thus the double relation is relevant again.

Poverty excites humility, as it leads to slavery, which subjects us to the will of others and leads to wants and mortifications.

Comparisons augment the sense of power, e.g. the rich man, who feels better about his situation by opposing it to that of the beggar. Power augments the feeling even more, in that there is a comparison between ourselves and those we command. This will be important in dealing later with malice and envy.