BOOK II. of the passions.

PART I. of pride and humility

SECTION VII. Of vice and virtue.

Now it is down to cases: can we find the double relation? "If we find that all these causes are related to self, and produce a pleasure or uneasiness separate from the passion, there will remain no farther scruple with regard to the present system."

The first case is "the most obvious causes of the passions of pride and humility, i.e., vice and virtue. The explanation is independent of whether moral distinctions between vice and virtue are based on nature or interests and education. (The issue is to be examined in Book III). Either explanation of the origin of the two will support the system, "which will be a strong proof of its solidity."

Even if morality is not based on nature, vice produces pain and virtue produces pleasure. Qualities are esteemed virtues because of their utility and vices because of their disutility. (A number of examples are given, including generocity/greed, courage/cowardice, justice/injustice, humility (which exalts) and pride (which mortifies us). [This seems to have the two reversed.]

The source of virtue is also the source of pride, and so for the source of vice and that of humility. So if virtue produces pleasure, which is also the source of pride, etc., "The virtue and vice must be part of our character in order to excite pride or humility. What farther proof can we desire, for the double relation of impressions and ideas?"

On the hypothesis that morality is founded on nature, pain and pleasure are the effects of certain characters and passions, The uneasiness and satisfaction are the nature and essence of vice and virtue. "To approve of a character is to feel an original delight upon its appearance." The pain and pleasure which are the causes of vices and virtues are the causes of the effects of them, including pride and humility, "which are the unavoidable attendants of that distinction."

But even if your reject this naturalistic view of morality, pain and pleasure are inseparable from vice and virtue, as is shown from examples, e.g. cruelty and treachery being displeasing.

Pride and humility are not limited to morality. We have a taste for good and bad wit, which is a sensation of pleasure from true wit and uneasiness from false, though we don’t know why we have these feelings.

Some may think pride is a vice, but "not to dispute about words, I observe, that by pride I understand that agreeable impression, which arises in the mind, when the view either of our virtue, beauty, riches or power makes us satisfy’d with ourselves," and conversely for humility. There is room in "the most rigid morality" to receive pleasure from reflecting on a generous action we have produced. We should examine these passions in themselves without getting moralistic about it.