Context

The author has distinguished in the previous section between direct and indirect passions. Direct passions arise immediately from our feelings of pleasure and pain, while indirect passions require something further in order to be produced. The direct passions will be treated in Part III. Part II will treat the indirect passions love and hatred. This section discovers the component parts of the cause of the indirect passions pride and humility.

Background

Hutcheson considered pride to be a passion that is based on the desire for honor which we all share. We wish others to approve of or be grateful for our good actions, and this approval or gratitude is a source of pleasure (joy) for us when it is obtained. On the other hand, disapproval or condemnation of our bad actions gives rise to a feeling of shame (Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions, Section I). Pride may be understood in several senses. That closest to the sense understood by the author is a feeling of joy when we apprehend a right or a claim to honor (Section III). However, pride is condemned when the claim to honor is not rightful. Another connotation of pride is that of ambition, a violent desire for honor or power

The Treatise

1. Because they are “simple and uniform impressions,” we cannot give a “ just definition” of any of the passions, including pride and humility. We can only describe them by listing the circumstances surrounding their occurrence. Everyone is familiar enough with the meaning of the words and the impressions represented by the words to prevent them from making mistakes about them. So the author will proceed with the examination of these two passions.

2. While pride and humility are “directly contrary,”, they have the same object, the self [which was investigated in Book I Part 4 Section 6 and is here described as “that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness”]. We always fix our view on the self when we feel pride or humility. We are elated with pride or dejected with humility depending on how “advantageous” is the idea of ourself. The view of the self is absolutely essential to these the production or modification (“encrease or diminution”) of pride or humility.

3. The self cannot be the cause or sufficient condition of these passions, though it is their “object.” The self as the cause of both would have to produce the two contrary passions in an equal degree whenever it operates, since it is “perfectly indifferent” to either one, “which opposition and contrariety must destroy both.” Although a person may be both proud and humble, this is either in succession, or the one annihilates the other and loses part of its own strength [as with probability, as described in Book I, Part 3, Sections 11 and 12]. “To excite any passion, and at the same time raise an equal share of its antagonist, is immediately to undo what was done, and must leave the mind at last perfectly calm and indifferent.”

4. Thus we must draw a distinction between the idea which causes a passion of pride or humility but is not its object and the object (the self, in the case of pride and humility) to which the passion is directed. The cause must be an idea that is “peculiar to one of the passions.” [That is, the idea must produce only a single passion. And the passion is not that of pride and humility, but rather one of pleasure or pain, as is described in paragraph 5 of Section 5, where the cause of the passion of pride or humility is supposed to have “a tendency to produce a pain or pleasure, independent of the passion.”] The sequence of the production of the passion of pride or humility is:

1. The occurrence of an idea (the cause or productive principle),
2. The passion [pleasure or pain] produced by the cause,
3. The idea to which our view is turned by the passion [of pleasure or pain] (the self, which is the object of the passions of pride and humility.).

5. The fact that a vast variety of subjects serve as causes of pride and humility is “their most remarkable property.” Pride is produced by “every valuable quality of the mind, whether of the imagination, judgment, memory or disposition.” These qualities include wit, good sense, learning, courage, justice, integrity. Possession of the opposite of these qualities, on the other hand, produces humility. Valuable qualities of the body, such as beauty, strength, agility, good mein, address in dancing, riding, fencing, and dexterity in any manual business or manufacture, also are causes of pride. Beyond these qualities that attach to the self immediately, there are others that induce pride through objects that “are in the least ally’d or related to us,” including country, family, children, relations, riches, houses, gardens, horses, dogs, and clothing.

6. The enumeration of causes of pride requires a distinction between the quality, the idea of which produces pride, and the subject having the quality. For example, the quality of beauty is possessed by a house, which is considered as the property or production of its proud owner. Both the quality and the subject having it (regarded in relation to the self) are essential to the production of the passion. Mere beauty does not produce pride unless it be the beauty of an object which is related to us. And what is related to us does not induce pride in us unless it has some agreeable quality, such as being beautiful. They should be considered component parts of the cause since, while they are easily separated, they must be conjoined in order to produce the passion.

Dissertation II: Of the Passions

After having described some of the direct passions in Section I, Hume made the following distinction at the beginning of Section II.

Besides those passions above-mentioned, which arise from a direct pursuit of good and aversion to evil, there are others which are of a more complicated nature, and imply more than one view or consideration. Thus Pride is a certain satisfaction in ourselves, on account of some accomplishment or possession, which we enjoy: Humility, on the other hand, is a dissatisfaction with ourselves, on account of some defect or infirmity.

With regard to all these passions, the causes are what excite the emotion; the object is what the mind directs its view to when the emotion is excited. Our merit, for instance, raises pride; and it is essential to pride to turn our view on ourselves with complacency and satisfaction.

[ Previous Section | Next Section | Treatise Contests | Text of the Treatise ]