G. J. Mattey’s Notes on Hume’s Treatise, Book 2, Part 1, Section 8

Notes on Hume’s Treatise

by G. J. Mattey

Book 2
Of the PASSIONS
PART 1
Of pride and humility.

Sect. 9. Of external advantages and disadvantages.

This Section is a continuation of the exposition of the causes of the indirect passions of pride and humility. The general system explaining the origins of these passions was developed in the first six Sections. Section 7 describes qualities of the mind, virtue and vice as causes of pride and humility, respectively, and Section 8 describes the corresponding qualities of the body, beauty and deformity.

Hutcheson’s Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections contains a treatment of some of what the author takes to be external causes of pride and humility. Rather than connecting them with pride and humility, he examines the reasons why they are desired and whether they are desirable. Hutcheson finds five primary desires, for: sensual pleasures, pleasures arising from the imagination, pleasures arising from the public good, virtue, and honor (Section I). Secondary desires are those which are thought to be conducive to the satisfaction of primary desires. Included in these are wealth, power, and marks of honor.

1. The natural and more immediate causes of pride and humility are qualities of the mind (Section 7) and body (Section 8). However experience shows us that there are many other causes of these passions, which are so numerous as sometimes to obscure the qualities of mind and body as causes. These external advantages include one’s:

2. A point worthy of remark is that although there are three principles that associate ideas in our minds, resemblance, contiguity, and causality, the first of these plays a much smaller role in the production of pride and humility than do the second and third. Suppose that I resemble another person regarding some worthy quality. My pride in myself is the product of my locating that quality in myself, and not in the other person. It is true that the quality in the other might suggest to me that I have that quality as well, but at that point, my view fixes at last, and the passion finds its ultimate and final cause.

3. The author concedes that at times we take pride in ourselves because we resemble a great person with respect to some quality, such as appearance, that does not contribute to his greatness. However, he believes that this phenomenon is rather insignificant, for the following reason. We would not care about the quality in question unless the person had other very shining qualities, which give us a respect and veneration for him. It is these qualities, which cause pride in ourselves because they are related to ourselves. They do so because they are parts of the whole person, and therefore are connected with the trifling qualities in which we resemble him. Those latter qualities, in turn, are connected by resemblance to our own qualities, which are parts of our whole selves. So there is formed from the substantial qualities of a person to the self a chain of several links betwixt ourselves and the shining qualities of the person we resemble. [Thus, the valuable qualities of the other person are the proper causes of our pride.] The fact that the original valuable quality reaches us only by a chain means that the resemblance is weakened. But more importantly, when we pass through the links of the chain and compare them with one another, we become aware of the contrast between the significance of some links and the trifling nature of others, and thus are in some measure asham’d of the comparison and resemblance.

4. So only either the relation of contiguity or that of causation is a requirement for the production of pride or humility. The relations themselves are nothing but qualities, by which the imagination is convey’d from one idea to another. It remains to examine how these relations function in the production of the passions at issue, and how it is that they are required to produce those passions. The operation of the relations in associating ideas in the minds takes place in the background, so to speak: in so so silent and imperceptible a manner, that we are scarce sensible of it, and discover it more by its effects than by any immediate feeling or perception. No emotion or new impression is produced by it. The only thing the association does is to modify ideas that we already have and which are capable of being remembered. [The association, in a sense, stimulates the memory so as to reproduce, in the presence of an idea, an associated idea.] Along with experience, this reasoning shows that the association of ideas alone is not sufficient for the production of a passion, despite its being necessary. [A passion is an impression, and the association of ideas does not produce impressions, but only ideas.]

5. Given the results of the last paragraph, there must in the production of the passions of pride and humility be some impression—either an emotion [a secondary impression] or an original impression [sensation] which is produced by some principle or other. This raises the question as to whether the impression produced is the passion pride or humility itself or something else. The author cites the many arguments he has already put forward as deciding in favor of the second option. He adds a further consideration, that the association of ideas would be superfluous in the process of producing the passion unless there were a relation of separate impressions corresponding to that of association between the two ideas. The role of the association is to facilitate the transition from an given impression to the passion itself. If the passion were produced immediately, the first impression would not be needed. On the other hand, if the two impressions are only related, we can easily see why they are [because this relation parallels that of the associated ideas], and how the two different associations, of impressions and ideas, by uniting their forces, may assist each other’s operation. Not only is this explanation easy to conceive, but it is the only one that can be conceived. The only way an easy transition between ideas is necessary to assist in the production of the passion, without producing it directly, is that it aids the transition from one impression to another. Another clear argument for the transition of affections along the relations of ideas is that the relative pride produced by an object varies not only with its own greatness, but also with the closeness of the object’s relation to the person. [E]very change in the relation produces a proportionable change in the passion. The author concludes that the part of his system that explains the relations of ideas is a sufficient proof of the part of the system that concerns impressions, and is itself so evidently founded on experience, that ’twould be lost time to endeavour farther to prove it.

6. A number of instances of the production of these passions are cited in support of the claim just made. External sources of pride in people are the beauty of their country, of their county, of their parish. It is clear that the idea of the beauty of these objects produces a pleasure. The cause of the pride [e.g., one’s country] is supposed to be related to the self, which is the object of the pride. There is then a transition from the pleasure in the beauty of the cause of pride to a pleasure in one’s self, due to the relation of the two pleasures and the relation of the cause and object of the passion.

7. Further examples are the pride people take in the climate, fertility, products, and language of their homeland. It is evident that all of these qualities produce sensual pleasures. The author asks how it is possible that these qualities could produce the passion of pride unless they were a relation between the idea of them and the idea of the person assisting the transition from the pleasure in the qualities to a pleasure in the thought of one’s self.

8. Some people take pride in themselves for having visited foreign countries which they claim to be superior to their own. The explanation given by the author is that the relation between themselves and their countrymen, when they are at home, is so strong and shared with so many people that it gets lost, in a manner of speaking. On the contrary, the number of travelers to the foreign country is so small that their impression of that country, from having visited it, is heightened. For this reason they always admire the beauty, utility and rarity of what is abroad, above what is at home.

9. The fact that we can take pride in countries, climates, or in general inanimate objects that are closely related to us makes it no mystery that we take pride in those with whom we have a relation of blood or friendship. The qualities that make a person proud of himself also make him proud of his relatives and friends when they possess them, though this pride is of a lesser degree than that produced by his own qualities. The beauty, address, merit, credit and honours of their kindred are carefully display’d by the proud, as some of the most considerable sources of their vanity.

10. For example, we are proud of the possession of riches in ourselves, and we seek to enhance this pride through our desire that anyone with any connection to us be rich as well, and we are ashamed of our poor relations and friends. So, we try to distance ourselves as much as possible from these people. We have no control over the wealth of our distant contemporary relations, and we take our ancestors to be most closely related to us. As a result, we act as if we belong to a good family and are descended from a long succession of rich and honourable ancestors.

11. The author now makes two observations, which he will attempt to explain, in the next two paragraphs, by mobilizing his system. The first, and frequent, observation is that people take more pride in a family that has owned and lived on the same piece of land for a long time. The second is that people are more prideful if that land has been passed down entirely through a chain of male heirs.

12. It is not only the length of the existence of one’s family or the number of one’s ancestors that instills pride in one’s heritage. The other ingredient is their riches and credit, which are suppos’d to reflect a luster on himself on account of his relation to them. The first act is reflection on these qualities, which produces pleasure. The second is relating them to himself, which produces pride, in that the ideas of the ancestors are related to the idea of himself, and the pleasurable impression of them is related to a pleasurable impression of himself. Because of the dependence of the passions on these two relations, whatever strengthens the relations will strengthen the passion, and whatever weakens the relations will weaken the passion. In the case at hand, the relation to one’s ancestors is strengthened by the continuous possession of the land. By this facility the [pleasurable] impression [of the qualities of the ancestors] is transmitted more entire, and excites a greater degree of pride and vanity.

13. The second case is treated in the same way. The author first notes a general quality of human nature that will be explained later.

The imagination naturally turns to what is considerable and important,and if two objects are presented to it, it will give the preference to the greater and disregard the lesser. The institution of marriage [at the time] gives the husband the advantage over the wife, so that he engages the imagination, whether he is present or stands in a line of ancestors. Then it is easily seen that this property of the imagination strengthens the relation to the father at the expense of the relation to the mother. The reason is that every relation is nothing but a propensity to pass from one idea to another. Thus, whatever makes the propensity stronger makes the relation stronger. Applied to the present case, there is a greater propensity to associate the idea of the offspring with the father than with the mother, so the relation to the father should be regarded as the closer and more considerable. The author uses this conclusion to explain why children are given the name of their father and why the child’s baseness or nobility is determined by that of his father and not his mother. It often happens, though, that the mother is possest of a superior spirit and genius to the father. The reason that the mother is not therefore more considerable and important than the father, and hence the one to whom the imagination turns, is that there are general rules that prevail. [The influence of general rules on the imagination has been discussed above in Book I, Part III, Section 13 and in Section 6 of the present Part. General rules are generalizations that may run counter to and weaken the associations formed from experience.] Thus, even when the qualities of the mother are superior enough to associate the offspring with her rather than her husband, the influence of general rules will weaken that association. When applied to the thought of a train of ancestors, this explains how the passage to the heritage through the mother weakens the relation of the ancestors. The weakened relation then results in a diminished feeling of pride. The imagination runs not along [the line of ancestors] with facility, or is able to transfer the honour and credit of the ancestors to their posterioty of the same name and family so readily, as when the transition is conformable to the gneral rules, and passes from father to son, or from brother to brother.

The transmission through males increases pride because of the relative social standing of males and females. “In the society of marriage, the male sex has the advantage above the female.” The general rule favors the father, even when the mother is superior in spirit and genius. It also weakens the transition in the imagination when the line of male succession is cut off.

Section II, item 8 reproduces almost verbatim the content of the present Section, except that it omits the discussion in paragraphs 2 through 5 of the general principles that govern the production of pride and humility with respect to external advantages and disadvantages. After reproducing the opening paragraph of the section, the author proceeds immediately to the discussion of examples, which begins at paragraph 6.