by G. J. Mattey
Book 2
Of the PASSIONS
PART 2
Of love and hatred.
Sect. 3. Difficulties solv’d.
1. The proofs given in the last section are sufficient to establish the causes of love and hatred, so no particular examination of the causes is needed. The rest of Part II will be devoted to removing difficulties for particular cases of love and hatred and examining its mixture with other emotions.
2. The kindness or ill-will we have toward another is directly proportional to the pleasure or uneasiness we receive from them. Someone may make himself agreeable to us through services, beauty, or flattery, thereby insuring our affection, and conversely with those who harm or displease us. So when we are at war [with our interests at stake], we are pleased by everything our own people and their allies do, hence loving them, and are displeased with everything our enemies do, thus hating them. The very same actions or qualities incite these opposite reactions. “’Tis evident the same method of thinking runs thro’ common life.”
3. Some people would add that it is not only the effects of others’ behavior on us that are relevant, but also the intention with which the act is undertaken. An accidental wound inflicted by another does not instill hatred, any more than an accidental service instills love. “By the intention we judge of the actions, and according as that is good or bad, they become causes of love or hatred.”
4. These two factors, action and intention, move Hume to make a distinction in the way love and hatred are caused. If there is a constant source of displeasure due to the character to the other, we hate him regardless of his particular actions. The converse holds for love. In general, actions do not come from what is durable, but is fleeting and pass in a moment as if they did not exist. Intention reveals the character, showing “certain qualities, which remaining after the action is perform’d, connect it with the person, and facilitate the transition of ideas from one to the other.” Only repentance and a change of life can change the passion we have toward the person. This is why an intention, and not merely an action, is needed to incite love or hatred.
5. The intention also has an effect on its own. The harm brought about intentionally by someone who hates us causes a more intense reaction of hatred in ourselves than it would without the intention.
6. Still, even without the intention, the hatred can arise, as experience shows. It may not last long, but it is enough to “show, that there is a natural connexion betwixt uneasiness and anger, and that the relation of impressions will operate upon a very small relation of ideas.” When the impression becomes less violent in time, the mind recognizes how slender the relation is, and reflecting on the character of the person, we cease to hate him.
7. A parallel example is a case where one harms us, not by accident, but out of duty. If we are at all reasonable, we are not angry at him and do not hate him, “notwithstanding he is both the cause, and the knowing cause of our suffering.”
8. Why is this? As before, we note that seldom does this circumstance actually prevent the passion from occurring: it only diminishes it. Almost all criminals bear some enmity toward their accuser and the judge, even if they know they deserver their punishment. This also happens in lawsuits and political contests. The other is regarded as our enemy, even though a moment’s reflection would show “that their motive is entirely as justifiable as our own.”
9. Another consideration is that the very fact of harm creates a presupposition that its perpetrator is a criminal, which proves that any harm or uneasiness “has a natural tendency to excite our hatred, and that afterwards we seek for reasons upon which we may justify or establish the passion.” The idea of injury is actually created by the passion, rather than creating the passion.
10. The passions avoid diminution as much as possible. So the opinion of injury helps sustain them. That of justice cancels out this effect. There is a struggle, where the strongest prevails, exciting the proper passion.
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