1. Just as pity imitates the effects of love, malice imitates the effects of hatred. The effect of the passion of malice is “joy in the sufferings and miseries of others, without any offence or injury on their part.”

2. In paragraph 7 below, the author claims to “derive” the passions of malice and envy from a principle that is developed in the present and succeeding paragraphs. The principle is: “that objects appear greater or less by a comparison with others.” The claim made in the present paragraph is that the soul has an “original quality” of judging the worth of objects on the basis of the comparison of them with other objects, rather than by discovering their “intrinsic worth and value.” This quality is accounted for by the fact that the “sentiments and opinions” of humans are little guided by reason [which presumably make judgments on the basis of intrinsic merit]. The consequence of this quality is that we de-value what is “really esteemable” when it falls short of some standard of perfection. The effect upon our sentiments of an intrinsically worthy object’s not meeting the standard is the same as the effect of something “defective and ill.” There is an analogy between the effect of objects on the sentiments and their effect on our bodies, as attested to by everyday experience. Two examples are given. The first [which is found in Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chapter VII, Section 21] is that of one hand’s being heated and the other’s being cooled and both being submerged in water. The hand that has been heated will feel cool and the hand that was cooled will feel warm. In general, “A small degree of any quality, succeeding a greater, produces the same sensation, as if less than it really is, and even sometimes as the opposite quality.” An example of a conversion to the opposite quality is that of a small pain which becomes a pleasure when following a violent pain, while a violent pain succeeding a gentle pain is “doubly grievous and uneasy.”

3. The forgoing account of the effect of the comparison of objects upon our sentiments leaves “some difficulties” unexplained. All comparisons of objects begin with our impressions and ideas [copies of impressions] of those objects. These perceptions do not vary in the way our sentiments do. Consider the impressions of two objects, object A being presented as larger than object B. The comparative largeness of A does not result in B’s looking smaller. The physiology of the body (image in the retina, etc.) results in an intrinsic or non-comparative appearance of the size of A and B. It seems possible that the imagination could produce some variability in the apparent sizes of A and B when their sizes are compared. But the author asserts that the imagination does not “alter the dimensions of objects on account of a comparison with others.” [But note there are various kinds of illusion, such as the Ebbinghaus illusion, that seem to contradict the author’s claim.] Given that perception is not affected by comparison, the author asks “how from the same impression and the same idea we can form such different judgments concerning the same object, and at one time admire its bulk, and at another despise its littleness?” The author claims that the variation must be accounted for by some perception, though not the “immediate” perception of the object.

4. The explanation of the disparity noted in the last paragraph requires recourse to two principle, one to be explained first at this point, and the otheralready explained. The present paragraph deals with the first principle, according to which every perception, whether of the senses or the imagination, is accompanied by some sentiment, though that sentiment may so customarily accompany the perception as not to be itself distinguishable from it. In such cases, the two can be distinguished through “careful and exact experiments.” Examples of size and number are given. Objects of great extent, such as the ocean, and of great number, such as a crowd, incite in us pleasurable sentiments. Moreover, the degree of pleasure varies directly with the size or number of the object. This is accounted for by the principle that the collective sentiment is the aggregation of smaller sentiments that accompany the perceptions of the parts of a large body or the members of a group. To support this conclusion the author appeals to a principle he had laid down in Book I, Part III, Section 15, to wit, “When any object encreases or diminishes with the encrease or diminution of its cause, ’tis to be regarded as a compounded effect, deriv’d from the union of the several different effects, which arise from the several different parts of the cause.” So the components of an aggregate perception are each accompanied by a sentiment, even to the point where the disagreeableness of one part is swamped by the agreeableness of the whole. “If this be allow’d with respect to extension and number, we can make no difficulty with respect to virtue and vice, wit and folly, riches and poverty, happiness and misery, and other objects of that kind, which are always attended with an evident emotion.

5. The second principle invoked to explain the difficulty noted in the third paragraph is that human judgment is deeply influenced by general rules. As explained in Book I, Part III, Section 13, general rules are a species of “unphilosophical probability.”. They are formed from habit and experience, and they are the source of prejudices that are maintained even in the face of contrary experience. In the present paragraph, the author notes that general rules have such influence as to be “able to impose on the very senses.” That is, our senses are “often perverted” by general rules to the extent that seem to support the errors of general rules even in cases where they ought to correct general rules when they are false. Suppose that we have formed a strong association between objects of one kind and those of another. When an object of the first kind appears, even in circumstances very different from those that led to the association, “we naturally fly to the conception of the second, and form an idea of it in as lively and strong a manner, as if we had infer’d its existence by the justest and most authentic conclusion of our understanding.”

6. At this point, the two principles can be applied to the phenomenon of the influence of comparison on our perception. The author had claimed in paragraph 3 that the variation in judgment concerning objects that are perceptually invariant is due to other impressions that accompany the perceptions of the objects. These accompanying perceptions are now identified with the sentiments or emotions which, it has been claimed, accompany all perceptions. Now suppose that object A is larger than object B. According to the principle given in paragraph 4, the perception of A is accompanied by a greater sentiment than that of B. The comparison of the sentiments increases the degree of intensity of the sentiment of B. The increased intensity of the sentiment of B is then transferred to the judgment of about B itself, presumably by a general rule that associates the degree of intensity of sentiment with the magnitude, so to speak, of the object. “The effect conveys our view to its usual cause, a certain degree of emotion to a certain magnitude of the object; nor do we consider, that the comparison may change the emotion without changing any thing in the object.” The author notes that this explanation is analogous to that found in “the metaphysical part of optics,” which shows how judgments of the understanding are transferred to the senses.

7. Having explained away its difficulty, the author returns to his initial principle, “that objects appear greater or less by a comparison with others,” which he takes to be indisputable due to the multitude of instances in which it holds. He takes this principle to be the basis of the passions of malice and envy.

8. Malice and envy arise from a comparison of one’s own situation with that of others. When we reflect upon it, we are happy or unhappy relative to the degree to which we find ourselves fortunate or unfortunate, respectively. The greater the degree of our “riches, and power, and merit, and reputation” we think we possess, the happier we are. But any intrinsic worth of these things is overwhelmed by the comparison we make of our own situation with the situations of others, so that “according as we observe a greater or lesser share of happiness or misery in others, we must make an estimate of our own, and feel a consequent pain or pleasure.” So the more happy we find others, the more miserable we feel about ourselves, and the more miserable we find others, the happier we feel about ourselves.

9. There is yet a further phenomenon to be explained, however—that of pity. When we find someone more miserable than ourselves, we transfer that person’s pain to ourselves. Yet at the same time, the miserable condition of the other produces happiness in us, so that we have is “a kind of pity reverst, or contrary sensations arising in the beholder, from those felt by the person, whom he considers.” The author claims that this is a general phenomenon: “in all kinds of comparison an object makes us always receive from another, to which it is compar’d, a sensation contrary to what arises from itself in its direct and immediate survey.” In the case of extension, a large object is considered even larger when compared to a small object than when considered in itself. In the case of deformity, we experience uneasiness when presented with the deformed object, but we experience delight when we compare it with a beautiful object, whose beauty is enhanced by the comparison. So it goes with happiness and misery. “The direct survey of another’s pleasure naturally gives us pleasure, and therefore produces pain when compar’d with our own. His pain, consider’d in itself, is painful to us, but augments the idea of our own happiness, and gives us pleasure.”

10. The account of malice just given is strengthened by the fact that it applies even to ourselves. That is, a pain we find in ourselves can give us pleasure, and a pleasure in ourselves can give us pain. The first case arises when we compare a past pain with a present satisfaction with our condition. The second arises when we compare past pleasures with a present dissatisfaction with our condition. “The comparison being the same, as when we reflect on the sentiments of others, must be attended with the same effects.”

11. The application of the account of malice to the self extends even to present pains which bring pleasure, to the extent that people will seek out afflictions, what the author calls “irregular appetites for evil.” The principle of comparison is supposed to explain this phenomenon. The first case arises with the difficulties of a friend or loved one. If one does something pleasurable, the contrast between that pleasure and the uneasiness of the friend diminishes the pleasure. Now according to the general principle, one would feel happier in comparing himself to the other, but in this case “grief is . . . supposed to be the predominate passion,” which results in any malicious happiness being “swallow’d up” in the grief. The second case is that of remorse for a crime that one has committed. Here, one’s present pleasure is contrasted with the deserved pain of punishment and becomes diminished by it, “which forces him, in a manner, to seek uneasiness, in order to avoid so disagreeable a contrast.”

12. The author now applies the account of the sentiment of malice to that of envy. What has been described thus far is a form of pleasure that arises upon the observation of pain in others. Malice itself is “the unprovok’d desire of producing evil to another, in order to reap a pleasure from the comparison.” Envy, on the other hand, results from the mere comparison of the present state of another with our own present state. We commonly view the other person’s situation to be superior to our own. “A superiority naturally seems to overshade us, and presents a disagreeable comparison.” Yet we can also envy our inferiors, in the sense that we wish to be able to view ourselves as even more superior to them. But when the inferior’s position improves and diminishes our superiority, we feel less pleasurable, and even painful. In such cases, there is a two-fold effect of comparison. First, there is pleasure at the comparison of one’s superiority to the other’s inferiority. But when the gap closes, a comparison between the inferior’s previous state to his present one can decrease our pleasure or even cause us pain.

13. It might be thought that there is a direct proportion between envy and the degree of contrast between the happiness or unhappiness of the envier and the envied. But experience shows that this is not the case, as a solider is much more apt to envy those immediately above him in rank than to envy the general, or a bad writer is more apt to envy someone slightly less bad than an eminent author. This phenomenon is explained in terms of principle introduced early in the Treatise. It is to be noted that the greatly inferior only remotely resembles the greatly superior and generally the two are not in close proximity to each other. But resemblance and contiguity were advanced by the author as two of the three principles by which our ideas are associated (the third being cause and effect). “Resemblance and proximity always produce a relation of ideas; and where you destroy these ties, however other accidents may bring the two ideas together; as they have no bond or connecting quality to join them in the imagination; ’tis impossible they can remain long united, or have any considerable influence on each other.”

14. The theme of the preceding paragraph is developed through the remainder on the section. In the present paragraph, a contrast is drawn between cases in which a comparison produces a passion and those in which it does not. In the case of ambition, the direct relation between the master and the slave produces a feeling of pleasure. But when there is no direct relation between what is being compared, there is no easy passage by the imagination between one perception and another, so that “the action of the mind is broke, and the fancy, in considering the second object, begins, as it were, upon a new footing.” Specifically, the phenomenon of increase or diminution by comparison is absent without there being something to link the two. “The want of relation in the ideas breaks the relation of the impressions, and by such a separation prevents their mutual operation and influence.”

15. Confirming examples are given. The poet does not envy the philosopher or a poet of a different genre, country, or time. “All these differences prevent or weaken the comparison, and consequently the passion.”

16. Once again the author tries to bolster his case by holding that his explanation applies to cases outside the range of what he is trying to explain. Thus, the difference in size between a mountain and a horse does not diminish the idea of a horse, but the greater size of a Flemish horse diminishes the idea of a Welsh horse viewed in itself.

17. The author then ventures into the domain of history for further confirmation. Parties to a civil war welcome the aid of foreign enemies because their domestic foes are closer to them and hence more odious to them. Similarly, nations that find their neighbors superior envy them, while might praise distant superior cultures. Thus, European travelers are willing to praise the Chinese and Persian nations while envying nearby countries.

18. A “no less remarkable” parallel case may be found in the arts. The author notes that the “rules of art and criticism” forbid the mixture of gravity and levity in a single work of literature. “These rules of art are founded on the qualities of human nature; and the quality of human nature, which requires a consistency in every performance, is that which renders the mind incapable of passing in a moment from one passion and disposition to a quite different one.” Yet if an author publishes a work with two pieces, one grave and one light, he is not to be blamed, for the two are not connected, even if read without pause between them. “Why, but because he considers these performances as entirely different, and by this break in the ideas, breaks to progress of the affections, and hinders to one from influencing or contradicting the other?”

19. The same holds for painting, where mixing an heroic and a comical design in one painting would be in bad taste, but hanging a heroic picture next to a comical one would not.

20. The bottom line is that comparisons are efficacious only if there is some relation that unites them in a way that allows an easy transition from an object, and its accompanying emotion, to that with which it is compared. This principle has been shown to operate on the understanding [in the case of cause and effect]. It also applies to the passions. It is possible to have contrary passions [say, love and hatred] so long as they concern objects not relevantly connected with each other. And it has been shown here that comparisons have little or no effect without such a connection. The conclusion is that because nothing happens without the connection, something, a relation of ideas, must exist in order to forward the connection. “When the absence of an object or quality removes any usual or natural effect, we may certainly conclude that its presence contributes to the production of the effect.”

[ Previous Section | Next Section | Treatise Contents | Text of the Treatise ]