Context

In the preceding Section, the author has made his case for his claim that human actions are necessitated, in the sense that they are uniform and that we make inferences about them based on this uniformity. In the present Section, he attempts to rebut three objections to his account of human action.

Background

The consequences for morality and religion of the doctrine of the necessity of human action had been widely debated.

The Treatise

1. The author believes that there are reasons for the prevalence of the doctrine of liberty, “however absurd it may be in one sense, and unintelligible in any other.” [The absurd sense apparently is that which reduces liberty to chance, as described in the last paragraph of the previous section. The unintelligible sense seems to be one that is opposed to an unintelligible sense of necessity ascribed to matter (see paragraph 4).] The first reason is described in the present paragraph. We do not feel violence or constraint accompanying our actions, and so we deem them not to have been necessitated. But this objection rests on a confusion. In fact, we do not feel constrained in our actions, and for this reason, we can rightly say that the actions are spontaneous and undertaken at liberty. But the liberty of spontaneity is not opposed to necessity. Rather, it is the liberty of indifference that is requires no cause for an action, which really is opposed to necessity. Few people are capable of making this distinction, but in fact, people commonly are concerned to preserve liberty only in the first sense. This is what we primarily think of as being liberty, yet we almost universally confuse spontaneity with indifference.

2. The second reason for denying the necessity of action is “a false sensation or experience even of the liberty of indifference.” This sensation is used as an argument for the existence of that kind of liberty. The author reiterates his view that necessity is not found in any action, but only in a thinking being who contemplates the action and is determined in thought “to infer its existence from some preceding object.” Opposed to this is “liberty or chance,” which must then be a looseness in the determination of thought to move from the idea of the action to that of a preceding object. We seldom find this looseness when reflecting on our actions, but we seem to feel it in the performance of the actions. This feeling or sensation has been taken to be a demonstrative or intuitive proof of actual indifference, on the grounds that “all related or resembling objects are taken for each other.” [Apparently, the feeling is taken to resemble the real thing.] In most of our actions, we feel that they are subject to our will, and in turn, we think that our will is subject to nothing. The reason is that if it is claimed that our will is subject to some cause, we perform an experiment on ourselves and feel that “it moves easily every way, and produces an image of itself even on that side, on which it did not settle.” We think that the will could have settled on the other side, because we can make it so settle on a second attempt, if challenged to do so. “But these efforts are all in vain; and whatever capricious and irregular actions we perform; as the desire of liberty is the sole motive of our actions; we can never free ourselves from the bonds of necessity.” [That is, the motive for the first exercise of the will, whatever it may be, is different from that for the second exercise, which is to prove one’s liberty. So the cause of the action of the will is different in the two cases.] Another difficulty is that our feeling of liberty is belied by the observations of other people, who are able generally to infer how we will act from our motives and character. Or, if this is not possible the spectator would think that it could be done “were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition. Now this is the very essence of necessity, according to the foregoing doctrine.” [That is, constant union of our motives and actions, along with an inference from the one to the other.]

3. The third reason for the favor shown for liberty over necessity is the (inappropriate) influence of religious thinking. The author asserts that consequences for religion have no place in philosophical thinking, and in fact, while being the most common kind of objection, it is the most blameable. We must reject a hypothesis because of its absurdity and resultant falsehood, but dangerous consequences for a body of doctrine are not grounds for so doing. Arguing on these grounds only discredits the disputant. However, the author will not hide behind this defense, and on the contrary, he will try to show that “the doctrine of necessity, according to my explication of it, is not only innocent, but even advantageous to religion and morality.”

4. The author once again recounts his system. Necessity is an essential part of the relation of cause and effect. And this relation was given two definitions in Book I, Part III, Section 14: it is placed “either in the constant union and conjunction of like objects, or in the inference of the mind from one to the other.” He claims that no one, whether an ordinary person, cleric, or scholar, denies that there is a constant union between human motives and circumstances and or actions, and no one fails to make inferences on this basis. One dispute may be over whether to call this “necessity,” but the author hopes that the use of the word will do no harm as long as his meaning is attached to it. The only other grounds for dispute will be that the definition is incomplete, and there must be something else in matter besides constant conjunction and a determination of the mind, if it is to be subject to necessity. The author notes that if there is something missing in the account of necessity regarding material objects, this has no consequences for religion. He would be happy to know what this missing element is, but that is of no account, because the two factors in his own account of necessity surely apply to the actions of the human mind. Since he limits his understanding of human action to them, then if there is some secret spring of action in matter, he is not claiming that the mind resembles that. On the other hand, he does ascribe to matter what “the most rigorous orthodoxy does or must allow to belong to the will.” Thus, the only difference between his account of action and the prevailing one is that he does not go as far as they do in accounting for necessity in matter.

5. Not only does the author find his account of human action consistent with morality and religion, but he thinks that it is essential to them. Without this kind of necessity “there must ensue and absolute subversion of both, and . . . every other supposition is entirely destructive of all laws both divine and human.” To begin with, human laws are based on reward and punishment on the supposition that “motives have an influence on the mind, and both produce the good and prevent the evil actions.” One can call this influence what one likes, but because of its connection with actions, it should, in accordance with common sense, be deemed a cause, “and look’d upon as an instance of that necessity, which I woul’d establish.”

6. If we think of God as a legislator, this reasoning applies equally well to divine law. God produces rewards and inflicts punishment as an incentive to obedience. Moreover, even if he is understood as as merely punishing crimes because of their badness, he could not inflict his punishments justly and equitably if necessity in the author’s sense were lacking. In fact, no reasonable being could see why punishment should be inflicted at all. What we condemn are people, and their actions are merely what brings condemnation upon them as bad persons. Yet if their actions were merely by chance, as is claimed in the doctrine of liberty, there is no connection between a person and his actions, “nor are men more accountable for those actions, which are design’d and premeditated, than for such as are the most casual and accidental.” Because actions are fleeting, they will not be connected with the agent without a cause in his character and disposition, and hence they will not redound to his honor or his infamy. Although the action may be in itself blameable, and “contrary to all the rules of morality and religion,” but if it is the product of chance, rather than something durable in the agent, no blame may be placed on him. “According to the hypothesis of liberty, therefore, a man is as pure and untainted, after having committed the most horrid crimes, as at the first moment of his birth, nor is his character in any way concern’d in his actions; since they are not deriv’d from it, and the wickedness of the one can never be us’d as a proof of the depravity of the other.” Although common opinion may oppose the author’s view, the fact is that necessity is required for the assignation of merit or demerit to a person.

7. People tend to be inconsistent in their thinking. An instance is that they reason according to principles of necessity in assigning merit and demerit, while they condemn necessity as destructive of such assignment. This can be seen from the fact that people are not blamed for actions which are not considered necessary, such as “such evil actions, as they perform ignorantly and casually, whatever may be their consequences.” The reason is “because the causes of these actions are only momentary, and terminate in them alone.” Again, we blame people more for premediated evil actions than from those performed in haste. A similar reason is given. Although “a hasty temper” is a cause in the mind, it operates only occasionally and is not reflective of the entire character. A further consideration is the redeeming power of repentance, especially if accompanied by reformation. The reason is that we deem someone a criminal because they operate according to evil principles, from which flow their crimes. When those principles are abandoned, the former crimes are no longer taken to be indicative of the person’s character, and the person is deemed no longer a criminal. But according to the doctrine of liberty, the actions never were an indication of criminality, and hence, because they were not undertaken from criminal principles, they are not criminal actions.

8. The author challenges the advocates of the liberty of chance to respond to these charges before criticizing his own system as being detrimental to religion and morality. They may declaim the author’s system to the people, but if they want to settle the matter in the court of philosophical opinion, they should explain why their conception of liberty does not amount to chance or disprove the claim that there is a constant union between character and motive, on the one hand, and action, on the other. The author expresses confidence that he would win this battle. He has now proved that all human actions has causes, and in the next section, he will describe what those causes are.

The Enquiry

The first reason for the denial of the necessity of human actions, the confusion of the liberty of spontaneity with that of indifference, is not mentioned in Section VIII of the Enquiry. The second reason for denying necessity, a feeling of indifference of the will, appears as a footnote in Part 1 of Section VIII, which is couched in mostly the same language as that of the Treatise. The third reason, consequences for morality and religion, is the content of Part 2. There is a sharp separation of the discussion of morality from that of religion. The description of the consequences for morality largely follows that in the Treatise, except for a further claim that liberty is essential to morality, because if an action is the result of “external violence,” it is not praiseworthy or blameworthy. The brief discussion in the Treatise of God as a lawgiver and as an enforcer of punishment is dropped in the Enquiry. In its place, there is a discussion of the role of God as the originator of the causal chains leading to human actions. Hume confronts the dilemma that either there there are no immoral actions or God is the author of immoral actions. The first horn of the dilemma cannot be evaded by the claim that good and evil apply only to the whole universe, because our sentiments make a real distinction between the good and evil of the specific persons and actions we experience. The second objection is acknowledged as difficult to evade rationally, but this is an indication of the weakness of our faculties, and the topic is best left alone by the philosopher, who has enough problems with the mere “examination of common life.”

[ Previous Section | Next Section | Treatise Index | Text of the Treatise ]