1. The author notes that there is a relation of “close union” between the imagination and the passions (“affections”). The relation is manifested in the fact that whatever influences the imagination influences the passions, at least to some extent. If the idea of a good or an evil becomes more vivid in the imagination, the passions correspondingly increase in their violence, “and keep pace with the imagination in all its variations.” This observed correlation may be the result of a principle that has already been mentioned, though the author will not try to determine whether or not it has this origin. The principle, introduced in Section 4, concerns the conversion of a lesser passion into a more dominant passion: “any attendant emotion is easily converted into the predominant.” [For example, the anger of a lover toward his mistress actually increases his love of her.] The author’s purposes will be served by examples showing that the imagination actually does influence the passions.

2. Before recounting instances of the influence of the imagination on the passions, the author makes a general point about the relative influence on the imagination of the ideas of two kinds of pleasures: those of which we are directly acquainted and those of whose nature we are ignorant. It may be that the latter pleasure is taken by one to be the superior pleasure, but the idea of the known pleasure remains more influential on the imagination. The reason for the greater influence lies in the nature of the ideas themselves. The idea with which one is acquainted is “particular and determinate,” as well as being “fix’t.” That is, the idea is not interchangeable with any other. If an idea involves only “general notion of pleasure. The more general the notion is, the less influential it is on the imagination, because it becomes increasingly “obscure.” The author recognizes that on his view, discussed in Book I, Part I, Section 7, each general idea is a particular idea that indifferently represents other ideas. Insofar as the general idea is particular, it is just as clear as a particular idea that is not general. However, because the former kind of particular idea represents indifferently, it can be exchanged easily for other particular ideas, in which case it is not “fix’t” like the latter kind of idea. This indifference results in the loss of influence on the imagination. The more general the idea, the more substitute particular ideas there are, and correspondingly, the less influence it has.

3. The principle laid down in the preceding paragraph is illustrated by a story from ancient Athens. The Athenian leader, Themistocles, conceived a plan to destroy the ships, which were assembled nearby, of all the rival Greek states, thereby securing control of the seas. However, he could not reveal his plan for its approval by the Athenian people without ensuring its failure. The Athenians asked that the plan be shared with Aristides, whom they trusted. Aristides told the people of the great advantage of the plan but also of its great injustice. The plan was unanimously rejected.

4. How is the action of the Athenians to be explained? The historian Rollin praised the Athenians for their preference for justice over advantage, despite their not being philosophers who understand that interest should always be subordinate to justice. The author disagrees with this lofty appraisal. The real reason that the proposal was rejected was its generality: it was something that would be highly advantageous, but what? The generality of the conception of the advantage places the thinking of the people on the same plane as that of the philosopher. The latter never balances particular interests against justice, but rather deals disinterestedly in generalities, just as the people did in the present case. If the Athenians had known what the specific advantage of the plan was, the idea of it would have stimulated their imaginations strongly. Given that people are commonly “unjust and violent,” it is inconceivable that they would have unanimously rejected the plan had they known what it was.

5. Now the author turns to another factor in the influence of the imagination on the passions. Our passions are stoked more violently by ideas of recent satisfactions than decayed ideas from the distant past. This can be explained by the fact that memory of the past satisfaction enlivens the idea of the future satisfaction. “The image of the past pleasure being strong and violent, bestows these qualities on the idea of the future pleasure, which is connected with it by the relation of resemblance.” The stronger the idea of the future pleasure, the stronger will be the passion associated with it.

6. A further phenomenon can be explained by the principle that the vivacity of the idea of one thing is passed on to the idea of something resembling it, and thereby influences the intensity of passion. We are more passionate about possibilities that suit our present way of life than those which would suit a way of life that does not resemble it.

7. A very powerful way that the imagination influences the passions is when it is aroused by eloquence. We may view an object as desirable or detestable, but we are barely moved to passion or action until our imagination is stimulated in the most graphic way by an orator.

8. Even a non-eloquent opinion by another, especially if it is voiced passionately, can move our imagination and thence give rise to passion, despite our initial indifference. This stimulation of the imagination is attributed to sympathy, which was described in Book II, Part I, Chapter 11 as “nothing but the conversion of an idea into an impression by force of the imagination.”

9. A different kind of consideration is now advanced. The force of the passions in general depends at least as much on the temper of the person as the object to which it is directed. One instance of this is that people with more vivid imaginations tend to be more passionate.

10. A final consideration is that the passions are aroused in the presence of belief, rather than by figments of the imagination. But belief itself is just a vivid idea that is related to a present impression, as the author argued in Book I, Part III, Section 7. Thus, production of a passion requires that the imagination endow an idea with enough vivacity to raise it to the level of belief, which corroborates the principle that the livelier the idea, the greater the passion.

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