1. There is nothing more certain than that men are largely governed by self-interest, whose scope usually extends not far beyond their friends and acquaintances. It is not less certain that it is in men’s interests to adopt universal and inflexible rules of justice in order to keep them out of “that wretched and savage condition, which is commonly represented as the state of nature.” Anyone with experience of society will not be mistaken about this interest, so “palpable and evident” is it. Because of this paramount interest, it is a puzzle as to why societal disorder arises at all, “and what principle there is in human nature so powerful as to overcome so strong a passion, or so violent as to obscure so clear a knowledge?”

2. In Book II, it was observed that the imagination can make objects appear more or less valuable than they really are, and that this affects our response of pleasure and displeasure. The livelier the idea commonly prevails over the fainter one, and “it must be a great superiority of value, that is able to compensate this advantage.” What is contiguous strikes us in a more lively way, and so it commonly operates with more force on the passions than what is remote. “Tho’ we may be fully convinc’d , that the latter object excels the former, we are not able to regulate our actions by this judgment; but yield to the sollicitations of our passions, which always plead in favour of whatever is near and contiguous.”

3. This accounts for conflicts of interests, and particular those in which people prefer lesser, though immediate, advantages over the greater and more remote advantage of the maintenance and preservation of society. “The consequences of every breach of equity seem to lie very remote, and are not able to counter-ballance any immediate advantage, that may be reap’d from it.” Still, these consequences are real. Everybody is subject to this weakness to some degree, so violations of equity are frequent, and society is endangered. There is also a feedback effect. If you and I both naturally breach equity, we imitate each other and give each other new reasons to breach equity again, “by showing me, that I shou’d be the cully [dupe] of my integrity, if I alone shou’d impose on myself a severe restraint amidst the licentiousness of others.”

4. On the surface, this disastrous tendency seems to be incurable. We can only overcome it by our consent, but how can we give our consent if we have our short-term interests naturally before our eyes? If we cannot prefer what is remote, how can we lie under an obligation to act with an eye to a remote end, when it is opposed to the end we actually prefer?

5. But we can see that there is in fact a remedy. The fact that we are inclined to ignore what is remote is the very source of our paying attention to it. What we find in experience is that what is remote is also very general. Our consideration of this is what is improperly called reason. I make a resolution to do something far in the future. Few details will be evident at the time. As the time draws nearer, details do emerge, and they have an influence, pushing me away from my original inclination and toward a new one, directed at the present good. We regret this tendency in ourselves and seek to overcome it through various devices, such as study and reflection, frequent meditation, repeated resolution, advice of friends. But they all are ineffectual, which leads us to look for a better way of overcoming our infirmity.

6. The only way to do this, consistent with our nature, is to make the observance of the laws something in our immediate interests and their violation something immediately undesirable. This is impractical for most people, so it is left to the few, the civil magistrates: kings and their ministers. Their present situation is satisfactory, and their immediate interest is in upholding society, so they are interested in justice. On the other hand, they have no interest, or only a remote interest, in injustice, “being indifferent persons to the greatest part of the state.” [They would have no reason to violate the equity of any anonymous person in particular.] “These persons, then, are not only induc’d to observe those rules [of justice] in their own conduct, but also to constrain others to a like regularity, and enforce the dictates of equity thro’ the whole society.” They may also create officers and military to assist them in this task.

7. The execution of justice is not the only advantage of this arrangement. There is also impartiality, because the executors of justice will be indifferent to the rest of society.

8. Execution and decision of justice are two advantages that allow us to acquire security against our own weakness and passion. Moreover, it can force people to make new conventions, rather than just enforcing the original ones, resulting in common ends and purposes that force us to seek our own advantage. This overcomes our preference for the near over the remote, an error that has the most fatal consequences for our conduct. An example of the benefit of government is that it can get a thousand people to co-operate on a project, where without it only a few could do so, because everyone would be trying to get out of the trouble and expense, which they would lay on all the rest. Magistrates can discover the interests of a considerable part of the people and set about to fulfill them, without having to answer to anyone. They prevent failures that would ruin the whole project, which they can do because of their disinterestedness with respect to “the failure of any one piece of the execution.” “Thus bridges are built; harbours open’d; ramparts raise’d; canals form’d; fleets equip’d; and armies disciplin’d; every where, by the care of government, which, tho’ compos’d of men subject to all human infirmities, becomes, by one of the finest and most subtile inventions imaginable, a composition, that is, in some measure, exempted from all these infirmities.”

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