1. The origin of the praise given to the goodness of human affections (their merit) will be explained in this section.

2. Experience shows that the generosity of men is very limited, extending to friends and family, and at most to countrymen. We judge a person’s moral character from the circle in which he moves, not from the largest circle, which would be expecting “impossibilities” of him. If the natural tendency of his passions leads him to be of service to others within his circle, we approve of his character. Moreover, we love the person, on the basis of the sympathy we have with the people he aids. [See Book II, Part 2, Section 1. An idea of the pleasure that arises in them is conjoined with an idea of him as causing that pleasure. The idea of the pleasure becomes a pleasurable impression, and we transfer that pleasure to a passion of love directed at him, through a “double relation” of ideas and impressions.] In judging the character, we leave our own interests aside. The reason we do so is because our interests are different from the interests of other people in other circumstances, which leads to “perpetual contradictions,” or opposing points of view based on individual interest. Only by looking past individual interests can we attain the proper perspective, which is whether the passion in the other person is useful to those to whom he is closely tied. “The only point of view, in which our sentiments concur with those of others, is, when we consider the tendency of any passion to the advantage or harm of those, who have any immediate connexion or intercourse with the person possess’d of it.” If the advantage to the other is something that is observable close-up, sympathy elicits our strong approval, while if it is remote, the sympathy is weaker proportionately, “and our praise or blame fainter and more doubtful.” The author makes an analogy with physical objects viewed at a distance, which look smaller as they get farther away. We do not say that their actual size changes, however, but we use reflection to correct the appearance and “arrive at a more constant and establish’d judgment concerning them.” In our “calm judgments concerning the characters of men,” we correct for the diminution in sympathy. Moreover, if we are going to communicate our sentiments to other people, this cannot be done from the point of view of one’s own limited situation. We need to form a “general and inalterable standard, by which we may approve or disapprove of characters and manners.” The heart does not generate the conclusions we draw or come to love or hate the person on this basis [given the diminished sympathy], but the general notions we use “are sufficient for discourse, and serve all our purposes in company, in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the schools.”

3. These principles account for the merit we assign to various character traits: generosity, humanity, compassion, gratitude, friendship, fidelity, zeal, disinterestedness, liberality and other features of a good and benevolent person. “A propensity to the tender passions makes a man agreeable and useful in all parts of life; and gives a just direction to all his other qualities, which otherwise may become prejudicial to society.” For example, courage and ambition, if not regulated by the tender passions, might produce a tyrant or a robber. This also holds for good judgment and intelligence, and similar qualities. “They are all indifferent in themselves to the interests of society, and have a tendency to the good or ill of mankind, according as they are directed by these other passions.”

4. We praise all the passions that partake of love, to a considerable extent, because love is immediately agreeable to the person who has it. A comparison is made with “great” sentiments, discussed in the last section. Tender sentiments also touch us “infinitely,” so much that tears form in our eyes merely by conceiving of a tender sentiment. We also respond to tenderness with tenderness of our own. “All this seems to me a proof, that our approbation has, in those cases, an origin different from the prospect of utility and advantage, either to ourselves or others.” In the cases of both great and tender sentiments, as well, those who have them sympathize with others who do, and give the kind of character they have approval as “the most accomplish’d.” “This must evidently proceed from an immediate sympathy, which men have with characters similar to their own. They enter with more warmth into such sentiments, and feel more sensibly the pleasure, which arises from them.”

5. A “man of humanity” is touched most by cases where someone has such great love for his friend that he is most attentive to his smaller concerns and is willing to sacrifice a great deal of what is in his own interest to take care of them. These “delicacies” have little useful effect for society as a whole, but the more minute they are, the greater the merit that is assigned to them. “The passions are so contagious, that they pass with the greatest facility from one person to another, and produce correspondent movements in all human breasts.” A strong show of friendship kindles my own passion, and makes me have affection toward the one who displays the friendship. This can be generalized to whatever is agreeable in a person. Sympathy gives rise to a pleasurable idea in me, and to form the passion of love, it only has to be directed at the person with the sentiment that induced it. “The transition from pleasure to love is easy; but the transition must here be still more easy; since the agreeable sentiment, which is excited by sympathy, is love itself; and there is nothing requir’d but to change the object.”

6. This explains “the peculiar merit of benevolence, in all its shapes and appearances.” It also explains the fact that certain weaknesses are accorded merit. A person may be excessively melancholy at the death of a friend, and yet is praised for this, because the sentiment is tender and produces pleasure in the beholder.

7. We can even assign merit to the angry passions, which are inherent in human beings. If someone lacks them altogether, we might account him simple or an imbecile. But if they are possessed in a small degree, then this very moderation is a cause for approval. This is due to “a certain indulgence due to human nature in this respect.”

8. But when these passions are excessive, and rise to the level of cruelty, “they form the most detested of all vices.” We sympathize with the victims, feeling their pain, which leads to the passion of hatred, which is stronger than any other we can feel.

9. Even if the harm is limited, it still produces a feeling of disapproval. “And we may observe in general, that if we can find any quality in a person, which renders him incommodious to those, who live and converse with him, we always allow it to be a fault or blemish, without any farther examination.” The good qualities we attribute to people are always those “which render him a safe companion, an easy friend, a gentle master, an agreeable husband, or an indulgent father.” Our judgment is based on his effect on the people immediately affected by him. “And ’tis a most certain rule, that if there be no relation of life, in which I cou’d not wish to stand to a particular person, his character must so far be allow’d to be perfect.” His character is completely perfect if he considers himself this way as well. “This is the ultimate test of merit and virtue.”

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