1. Thus far, the treatment of the natural virtues has been directed at qualities of the mind. The passions, however, are affected as well by the advantages of the body and of fortune. These two will be considered in this section. The author recapitulates the way in which the passions are produced, as described in Book 2. The advantages or disadvantages produce impressions of pain or pleasure. When pain or pleasure results from “the general survey or view of any action or quality of the mind,” approbation or blame arises, “which is nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred.” There are four different sources of the pain or pleasure (utility or agreeableness in one’s self or another). The same principles give rise to pleasure or pain regarding the advantages or disadvantages of the body or of fortune. Usefulness and agreeableness convey “an immediate pleasure to the person, who considers the object, and command his love and approbation.”

2. To illustrate the way this works with advantages of the body, the author considers the “good women’s man“ [or “ladies’ man,” as we would now say]. This is a person who is skilled at the art of love, or whose “make of body promises any extraordinary vigour” in love-making. These men naturally engage the affections of women. “Here ’tis evident, that the ability of such a person to give enjoyment, is the real source of that love and esteem he meets with among the female.” Even those women who would never engage in sex with him are affected, due to their sympathy with those who have “a commerce of love with him.” So what incites the passions here is usefulness to others. The author notes that this example seems to be trivial or ludicrous. But it is not trivial, because it helps confirm an important doctrine, and it is not ludicrous, because it is legitimately used in philosophical reasoning.

3. A good body is useful to a person who has it. The author cites the advantages of strength and agility, which are major contributors to the beauty of animals. For a human being, signs of vigor are found in “broad shoulders, a lank belly, firm joints, taper legs.” We naturally sympathize with pleasure in the possessor of those qualities resulting from their usefulness to him, and we receive a pleasure from their enjoyment by him.

4. Having treated of the usefulness of the body, the author turns to the pleasure occasioned by “an air of health, as well as of strength and agility” in others, which contributes greatly to their beauty. On the other hand, “a sickly air” is disagreeable because it conveys a painful impression. The case is the same when we ourselves possess the pleasing qualities, even if they are not useful to ourselves. The author claims that we get the pleasure by setting ourselves “at a distance” and thinking about how others perceive us. Then it is by sympathy that we gain the requisite pleasure from our own beauty.

5. As far as fortune is concerned, there are three principles at work, as was described in Book II, Part 2, Section 10. First, we have pleasure in the contemplation of the beautiful and useful items a rich person possesses. Secondly, there is the thought of advantage we might get from the beneficence of the rich person. Thirdly, there is the sympathy we have with the pleasurable feeling had by the rich person in the presence of the objects that are the product of his fortune. Whichever of these three principles we use to explain our esteem for the rich person, “we may clearly see the traces of those principle, which give rise to the sense of vice and virtue.” The author declares that the most plausible explanation of the esteem is to be found in the feeling of sympathy, since we esteem the person without thought of any advantage we might reap from him. “We consider him as a person capable of contributing to the happiness or enjoyment of his fellow-creatures, whose sentiments, with regard to him, we naturally embrace.” Moreover, even if the other two principles operate through sympathy, it is best to take the most “immediate and direct” principle as fundamental. And in addition, there is a separate factor described in the last section, namely, that a person of fortune is very considerable, and this incites a more vivid sympathetic reaction.

6. The author concludes by making a comment about “the flexibility of our sentiments, and the several changes they so readily receive from the objects, with which they are conjoin’d.” If the sentiments of approval are directed toward a single kind of object, they are largely the same, but when directed toward different kinds of objects, they produced different feelings. So if the kind of object in question is a physical object and the sentiment is one of beauty, we get pretty much the same feeling whether the sentiment is produced as the result of the mere appearance of the thing, or sympathy, or an idea of utility. Similarly, if we are considering the characters of other people, the feeling is similar no matter which of these factors may be the source. But now let the source be the same and the objects vary. The source might be “sympathy and idea of their utility,” and the objects are “a convenient house” and “ a virtuous character.” The feeling of approbation is different. The author admits that he cannot explain the difference, but it must be allowed as a phenomenon. “There is something very inexplicable in this variation of our feelings; but ’tis what we have experience of with regard to all our passions and sentiments.”

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