1. Political writers who have explained the source of allegiance to government in an original contract or promise have tried to establish a principle which is correct and justified. The principle is that our allegiance to government is subject to exceptions, and it may be annulled when the government is egregiously tyrannical. But their appeal to the contract is itself “fallacious and sophistical.” The argument used by contract theorists is this. The government exists because of an agreement, based on “free and voluntary consent,” according to which they give up their natural liberty to a government that is supposed to advance the “protection and security” of those who agree to be governed by it. In exchange, those who govern gain the advantage of being able to command obedience. This agreement is “conditional,” in the sense that it is only in force if the purpose of the agreement is being served. In the case of a tyrannical and oppressive government, the purpose is not served, and so the promise to submit to the government is rendered null and void, and those who had agreed to give up their liberty are then entitled to receive it back. People would not foolishly agree to surrender their freedom if they knew that they would draw no benefit from the establishment of government, and that only those who govern would benefit from the arrangement.

2. It is not necessary to appeal to an original contract in order to establish the principle that when governments become tyrannical, the governed are free from any obligation to obey them. The principle may instead be justified merely by appealing to the interests people have in submitting to government, since promises (such as the contract) are nothing more than conventions undertaken by people to advance their interests. The interest that motivates people to form governments and obey them is “the security and protection, which we enjoy in political society, and which we can never attain, when perfectly free and independent.” This interest is “the immediate sanction of government,” and when the interest is no longer met, as in the case of an intolerably oppressive government, there is no longer any reason to submit to that government. When the cause (security and protection) of our allegiance ceases to exist, the effect (obedience to the government) ceases as well.

3. The preceding explanation of the source of allegiance to government explains why we have a natural obligation to obey the government: obedience is the effect of a specific cause, which is the pursuit of our interests. Some might think that even if the natural obligation ceases, there would remain a moral obligation. That is, while a tyrannical government may cease to serve our interest in security and protection, it would remain a “crime or injustice” to disobey it, since we are still “bound by conscience.” But the moral obligation to obey depends on the interests that underlie the the natural obligation, so if there is a moral obligation without there being a natural obligation, the cause (serving our interests) would cease while the effect (obligation to obey) would continue to exist. This would violate the general principle that “when the cause ceases, the effect must cease also.” But why would we think that the effect would continue to exist without the cause? The answer lies in our use of general rules (introduced in 1.3.13), to which “men are mightily addicted.” In the present case, the general rule is that we ought to obey the government, and it is taken to apply to all cases, including the case where the government is tyrannical. This is a mistake, however, because the condition that is the basis of the general rule is no longer operative. “Where cases are similar in many circumstances, we are apt to put them on the same footing, without considering, that they differ in the most material circumstances, and that the resemblance is more apparent than real.” A general rule may have an exception when the exception has “the qualities of a general rule, and be founded on very numerous and common instances. Now this I assert to be entirely the present case.” We find these instances in our observation of human behavior and our knowledge of human nature. The reason we need the protection of the government in the first place is to provide “some security against the wickedness and injustice of men, who are perpetually carry’d, by their unruly passions, and by their present and immediate interest, to the violation of all the laws of society.” People do not automatically lose these passions when they are installed as rulers. To be sure, when they take power, the rulers gain “an immediate interest in the preservation of order and the execution of justice.” But this interest is not so immediate in cases of disputes with their subjects. Moreover, human nature is such that people will, under the influence of their passions, act against their immediate interests, transported “into all the excesses of cruelty and ambition.” The bottom line is that the general rule to obey the government in all circumstances is undermined by these observations, and there is no moral obligation to do so when the interests on which the government is based are no longer operative.

4. The principle that it is not obligatory to obey a tyrannical government is universally accepted. People who take up arms against their tyrants (e.g., Nero) are not blamed for resisting. Anyone who would advocate “passive obedience” to even the most tyrannical governors and would condemn resistance to them embraces an “absurdity” that could arise only through “the most violent perversion of common sense.” The general opinion of mankind is infallible in cases of morals, even if most people cannot explain the source of their opinion. Everyone has at least an implicit notion of the basis for obedience to government and when obedience is no longer called for. The reasoning which is implicitly grasped is this:

Government is a mere human invention for the interest of society. Where the tyranny of the governor removes this interest, it also removes the natural obligation to obedience. The moral obligation is founded on the natural, and therefore must cease where that ceases; especially where the subject is such as makes us foresee vary many occasions wherein the natural obligation may cease, and causes us to form a kind of general rule for the regulation of our conduct in such occurrences.

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