Context

In the previous two sections, the author had discussed the nature of the allegiance to governmental authority. In Section 8, he had argued that the source of allegiance is based on the public interest and is independent of all contracts or promises. In Section 9, he had claimed that the extent of allegiance is to be measured by the degree to which the public interest is served. The present section addresses the question of who exactly is the magistrate who is the object of our allegiance.

The Treatise

1. In the previous section, the author had laid down the conditions under which resistance to governmental authority is justified. He cautions here that such resistance should be undertaken only in extreme cases such as of “grievous tyranny and oppression,” while “the common rule requires submission.” Resistance to supreme governmental power in the ordinary course of affairs is as “pernicious and criminal” an act as there can be. An obvious difficulty with resistance is the “convulsion” it brings with it. But more importantly, it undermines government itself and promotes “an universal anarchy and confusion among mankind.” Government is necessary for the public interest, and government can serve this function only if its authority is obeyed exactly. Thus, if the question is whether to rebel against the authority, the disadvantages attending to revolution must be carefully weighed against any advantage that might be gained from it.

2. Given that in the common course of affairs, “blind submission” is called, for, the question arises as to the object of that submission: “to whom it is due, and whom we are to regard as our lawful magistrates.” Here, the author takes the initial establishment of the magistrate to be a direct consequence of the voluntary contract that first establishes government itself (as described in Section 7). It is evident “that the same convention, which establishes government, will also determine the persons who are to govern, and will remove all doubt and ambiguity in this particular.” The object of allegiance is a necessary component of the contract, as it would be impossible for there to be a government without a governor or governors.

3. The author here invokes the results of Section 8, according to which after a period of time, the original contract is supplanted by an independent basis of the authority of government, which is the public interest. Since there is no contract in force, the object of authority is no longer generated automatically, so to speak. We do take ourselves to be bound to submit to particular persons, but it is not immediately clear why it is those persons and not others. It might be thought that the objects of allegiance should be those persons who would best serve our interests, since promotion of our interests is the rationale for the existence of government. But the author maintains that because of the complexity and conflicts of our interests, it would be utterly impractical to establish authority on this basis. “The same interest, therefore, which causes us to submit to magistracy, makes us renounce itself in the choice of our magistrates, and binds us down to a certain form of government, and to particular persons, without allowing us to aspire to the utmost perfection of either.” An analogy is made to the case of rules governing the possession of property. It is in the general interest that possession of property should be stable, but it is impossible to determine the most advantageous specific distribution of property. As a result, we proceed by use of “general rules“ that promote our general interests. The shift from our specific advantage to the general advantage does not diminish our adherence to the general rules governing possession of property, because our strongest interest is in promoting the general advantage. Our specific interests serve only to give direction to the impulse of the mind to follow the general rules. The case of government works in exactly the same way. The existence of government is to the general advantage, and nothing is more advantageous than that. So we heartily embrace the institution of government “tho’ we are oblig’d afterwards to regulate and direct our devotion to government by several considerations, which are not of the same importance, and to choose our magistrates without having in view any particular advantage from the choice.”

4. The author will describe five bases for magisterial authority. The first such basis is that of “long possession in any one form of government, or succession of princes.” The principle of long possession applies to the great majority of established governments. At the beginnings of governments, the location of authority is uncertain, as there is a chaotic struggle for power. It is only the passage of time which allows the established authority to appear “just and reasonable.” Over time, people become accustomed to a ruling authority, and custom is the most powerful influence on our sentiments and imagination. “When we have been long accustom’d to obey any set of men, that general instinct or tendency, which we have to suppose a moral obligation attending loyalty, takes easily this direction, and chooses that set of men for its object.” Thus, as noted in the last paragraph, it is our general interest that gives us the general instinct to submit to authority, but custom is what determines the particular form the authority will take.

5. The effects of long possession on the mind may be contrasted with those of short possession. The author lays down a general principle, “that the same length of time has a different influence on our sentiments of morality, according to its different influence on the mind.” With respect to many objects, such as a horse or a suit of clothing, short possession is sufficient to establish the legitimacy of ownership. But with respect to government, even a century may not be enough time to remove all doubts about the legitimacy of the authority. A further difference with respect to short possession is that it confers more legitimacy on a seizure of additional power by a magistrate than on the seizure of power in the first place. An example is the the takeover of the French monarchy by Henry IV of the Bourbon family after a civil war. Although the Bourbon dynasty was in power for only three generations, its power had been extended to the point where the French would not claim to have any liberties. The author now claims that this fact can be explained on the basis of his account of the right to property by accession, in Section 3. The idea was that one has the rights to what is intimately related to what is already one’s property, such as the fruit from one’s trees. We tend to connect such related objects in the imagination and pass the qualities of one (e.g., ownership) to those of the other. Presumably, the explanation of the relatively fast consolidation of power by the Bourbons is that further powers the sovereign might have are intimately related to the ones he already has, and the imagination passes easily from the legitimacy of the existing powers to the legitimacy of the newly usurped powers.

6. The second source of political legitimacy of authority is the present possession of authority. This source comes into play only when there is no long possession of authority. The author recalls that the legitimacy of authority is based on its constant possession, “maintain’d by the laws of society and the interests of mankind.” Present possession is naturally connected with constant possession which is advantageous to society (as described in paragraph 3 above). Now constant possession of property is also advantageous to society (as described in Section 3), so it might seem that present possession would establish the legitimacy of property. However, the author had denied in paragraph 5 of Section 3 that present possession can establish such legitimacy, except at the inception of society. The reason is that anyone could steal what they please and then claim ownership on the basis of present possession of the property. How, then, can a prince steal the power of government and achieve legitimacy of his authority on the grounds that he presently possesses the stolen power? The answer is that the public has a strong interest in the stability of authority, however, it was attained, because the alternative is inevitably “bloodshed and confusion.”

7. The author now continues his defense of present possession of authority as a source of its legitimacy. He claims that it would be very paradoxical and an affront to common sense to deny absolutely the moral legitimacy conferred by present possession. “No maxim is more conformable, both to prudence and morals, than to submit quietly to the government, which we find establish’d in the country where we happen to live, without enquiring too curiously into its origins and first establishment. Few governments will bear being examin’d so rigorously.” For example, the government of the Roman empire was constantly re-established by force, with new emperors and governors put in place by the military. So we are left with a dilemma. Either we hold that over the many centuries, the Romans had no legitimate government, or we “must allow, that the right of the stronger, in public affairs, is to be receiv’d as legitimate, and authoriz’d by morality, when not oppos’d by any other title.” The author grasps the second horn of the dilemma: might sometimes is right.

8. The third source of the legitimacy of authority is conquest, which is very much like present possession, except that it is carried out by opposing sovereigns, rather than by domestic usurpers. In fact, it carries more legitimacy than usurpation, because we tend to approve of conquering heroes with their glory and honor than of dishonorable usurpers, who are hated and detested. “Men naturally favour those they love; and therefore are more apt to ascribe a right to successful violence, betwixt one sovereign and another, than to the successful rebellion of a subject against his sovereign.”

Footnote. The author disclaims giving favor of present possession or conquest over long possession or positive laws (the latter being described in paragraph 14 below). Rather, they serve only to provide some force to claims of legitimacy where all else is equal or even when long possession or positive laws have slightly greater title to legitimacy. But it is hard to say how much force they can confer. The clearest case is in disputes between princes over sovereignty.

9. The fourth source of legitimacy is succession, which is the natural alternative when neither long or present possession nor conquest are in play. It generally takes the form of the inheritance of authority by the son of the sovereign. There are several factors favoring succession: (1) the presumed consent of the father to transfer his authority, (2) the fact that authority in the family is passed on by succession, (3) the interest of the state in choosing someone who is most powerful and has the most followers.

Footnote. This form of succession, where a choice of successor is made, is to be distinguished from hereditary monarchies, which have a customary mechanism of succession. The authority of the latter is based on long possession.

10. The reasons “of justice and interest” just described are not the only ones favoring succession. Of some weight are “principles of the imagination.” The son of the sovereign resembles his father, and the imagination naturally carries over the idea of a property of the father (authority) to the idea of the son, especially when the father dies. “So that nothing is more natural than to compleat this union by a new relation, and by putting him actually in possession of seems so naturally to belong to him,” that is, legitimacy of authority.

11. In confirmation of this account of the influence of the imagination, the author considers elective monarchies, where succession of the son is not guaranteed. The imagination naturally suggests a member of the royal family as a successor. This can lead to one of two results. One is to favor the succession of a family member, and the other is to exclude all family members. The latter course is explained by “a refinement in politics” whereby the natural course of the imagination is recognized and seen to be a threat to liberty, in that it encourages dynasties over election.

12. Further confirmation of the influence of the imagination is the case of the two sons of the Persian king Darius II, Artaxerxes and his younger brother Cyrus. The latter made the case that he was the rightful heir because he was born after his father attained the kingship. The author does not endorse this argument but only points out that it has its basis in the association in the imagination between the royal authority that Darius had at the time Cyrus was born and Cyrus himself. That connection did not exist with Artaxerxes, whose only claim to succession was that he was first-born.

13. Another possible basis for the adoption of succession as a basis for authority is the convenience of a process that transfers authority automatically and avoids the turmoil of election. The author concedes that this may play some role, but there must still be some means of determining which convenient process to use. Thus, the considerations given above have to be invoked to explain why succession is not simply based on positive law. That it is not based on positive law can be seen from the fact that the laws of so many nations are similar. There must be a natural basis for this, and it lies in the explanation the author has given.

14. Positive laws, which establish a form of government and a manner of passing on authority, are in fact the fifth source of authority. But this raises a question of priority: how could the government have authority to enact positive laws to establish authority, unless it had already received its authority by one of the four means discussed above? The author grants that the government gets its authority in one of these ways, but that authority is weakened in the sense that the positive laws it enacts have less force than that of long possession. Suppose a government were to change its constitution to establish an entirely new form of rule. The only motive the people would have to regard the new form as legitimate is that the change promotes the public good. Otherwise, they would regard only the old form as legitimate and consider themselves free to revert to it. This explains “the notion of fundamental laws, which are suppos’d to be inalterable by the will of the sovereign.” An example is the Salic law of France, which prohibits female succession in the royalty. The author cautions that it is impossible to determine fully rationally the limits of legislative power and innovation, due to the “insensible gradation from the most material laws to the most trivial, and from the most antient laws to the most modern.” Determination of these limits is influenced more by imagination and passion than by reason.

15. The author now elaborates on the claim he has just made about “disputes concerning the rights of princes.” History shows that these disputes should be treated “very lightly” due to the chaotic way in which governments have been established. The study of history will convince one “that a strict adherence to any general rules, and the rigid loyalty to particular persons and families, on which some people set so high a value, are virtues that hold less of reason, than of bigotry and superstition.” “True philosophy” yields the same result. The ultimate goal of government is the public good, and if it is being served to some extent, then “the concurrence of all those titles, original contract, long possession, present possession, succession, and positive laws, forms the strongest title to sovereignty, and is justly regarded as sacred and inviolable.” But often these titles are in conflict, and in that case, it is brute force that determines legitimacy rather than “the arguments of lawyers and philosophers.” An example of this is the case of the Roman emperor Tiberius, who had two sons, Germanicus and Drusus. Suppose Tiberius had not designated either one as his successor, while they were still alive. Perhaps Drusus, since he was the natural son of Tiberius, while Germanicus was adopted. But in Roman society, adoptees had equal rights of succession in private families, so why should they not in the public realm? Perhaps the eldest son. But again, private Roman families did not recognize age as determinative of succession. Moreover, although Germanicus was chronologically older than Drusus, he was adopted after the birth of his brother. In fact, it is hard to say that the title of emperor was even hereditary, as the empire had only been in existence for two generations. It may have been, at that stage, that title went to the stronger party. The author concludes that an impartial, purely rational, philosophical, investigation could never settle these questions.

16. The final four paragraphs of the section discuss the legitimacy of the government that resulted from the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688, in which King James II was replaced by William of Orange. The author begins by recalling a claim he had made in the last section, that once a government tyrannically opposes the public interest, there is a right of rebellion against it. But this general principle does not establish any precise rules for determining in which cases revolution is justified. And in fact, neither laws nor philosophy can do this. One would expect that a supremely powerful sovereign would never allow a law that would sanction rebellion, but even in a government with divided powers, there may be no such laws. To some extent, this is due to the respect that an eminent and powerful magistrate may command. But it is also prudent for there not to be such specific laws, in that the behavior of the magistrate will sometimes be harmful yet sometimes beneficial, so that overthrow is not justified. However, the absence of laws allowing resistance does not mean that resistance is not sometimes legitimate, “since ’tis impossible, even in the most despotic governments, to deprive them of“ the right to resist in the interests of self-preservation and the public good. The author then claims that in fact the right of resistance is even stronger in limited governments than in “arbitrary” ones. The reason is that in a “mix’d” government, not only the people as a whole, but also the different parts of government, have their own rights that they are entitled to defend. An analogy is made with the physical property of resistance in matter. Just as there would be no reason for matter to exist if it could not resist the encroachment of its space, there would be no reason for a branch of government to exist if it could not resist encroachment of its powers. If the people have a share of power, it is absurd to claim that they have no right to defend it. “Those, therefore, who woul’d seem to respect our free government, and yet deny the right of resistance, have renounc’d all pretensions to common sense, and do not merit a serious answer.”

17. The author will conclude the section with two observations about the Glorious Revolution and will not try to determine whether it was justified given his principles.

18. The first observation concerns the overthrow of the existing monarchy by the parliament. Nobody would say that it is justified if the public interest is not seriously undermined by the monarch, but if it is, there is a right not only to depose him but also to exclude his progeny from the throne. It is this right that the author tries to explain on the basis of “a very singular quality of our thought and imagination.” It is reasonable to think that the deposition of a king is like his death: in both cases, the son should ascend to the throne. However, there is a contrary way of thinking. The idea is that although deposition is ordinarily illegal, in extreme cases it is justified for the parliament to undertake it. Once we recognize that it is legitimate for the parliament to do this, we naturally attribute to it further powers, “and the antient bounds of the laws being once transgress’d with approbation, we are not apt to be so strict in confining ourselves precisely within their limits.” This new permissiveness is explained by a natural tendency of the mind to continue in the same course on which it has started. [We might describe as a kind of mental inertia, and it is most fully described in Book I, Part IV, Section 2, paragraph 22]. This applies to actions as well: once we embark on a course of action, we do not consider whether further actions of a similar kind are justified. This is why in the Revolution, the treatment of the father was extended to the son, though it would not have been had the father died in normal circumstances. The effects of the imagination should be respected in the laws: the succession should be determined according as ordinary people would regard the successor as legitimate.

19. The final observation concerns a way of achieving legitimacy that at first blush seems most unreasonable. The actions of William are justified by those of his descendants. “Princes often seem to acquire a right from their successors, as well as from their ancestors; and a king, who during his life-time might justly be deem’d an usurper, will be regarded by posterity as a lawful prince, because he has had the good fortune to settle his family on the throne, and entirely change the antient form of government.” An example is that of Julius Caesar, who overthrew the Roman republic but produced a line of emperors who made his overthrow seem legitimate. Two earlier revolutionaries, Sulla and Marius, did not have the same good fortune as Caesar and were considered tyrants and usurpers. “Time and custom give authority to all forms of government, and all successions of princes; and that power, which at first was founded only on injustice and violence, becomes in time legal and obligatory.” This status at the present time is then transferred to the past time, as the descendant is related to the ancestor in the imagination. The author concludes with two historical observations to bolster his thesis. Because the present (Bourbon) king of France was descended from Hugo Capet, the latter is considered more lawful than Cromwell, who did not establish a lasting government. On the other side, the resistance of the Dutch to the tyrant Philip II is justified by the current freedom of the Dutch people.

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